

## 5      The inner self in the schizoid condition

*You can hold yourself back from the sufferings  
of the world, this is something you are free to  
do and is in accord with your nature, but perhaps  
precisely this holding back is the only suffering  
that you might be able to avoid.*

FRANZ KAFKA

In the schizoid condition here described there is a persistent scission between the self and the body. What the individual regards as his true self is experienced as more or less disembodied, and bodily experience and actions are in turn felt to be part of the false-self system.

It is now necessary to consider the two elements in this split in more detail, and also the relationship of the one to the other. First, we consider the mental or unembodied self.

It is well known that temporary states of dissociation of the self from the body occur in normal people. In general, one can say that it is a response that appears to be available to most people who find themselves enclosed within a threatening experience from which there is no physical escape. Prisoners in concentration camps *tried to* feel that way, for the camp offered no possible way out either spatially or at the end of a period of time. The only way out was by a psychical withdrawal 'into' one's self and 'out of the body. This dissociation is characteristically associated with such thoughts as 'This is like a dream', 'This seems unreal', 'I can't believe this is true', 'Nothing seemed to be touching me', 'I cannot take it in', 'This is not happening to me', i.e. with feelings of estrangement and derealization. The body may go on acting in an outwardly normal way, but inwardly it is felt to be acting on its own, automatically.

However, despite the dream-nature or unreality of experience, and the automatic nature of action, the self is at the same time far from 'sleepy'; indeed, it is excessively alert, and may be thinking and observing with exceptional lucidity.

The temporary estrangement of the self from the body may be represented in dreams.

A girl of nineteen, the date of whose marriage was fast approaching, a marriage she had come to dread for various reasons, dreamed that she was in the back seat of a car, which was driving itself. This girl was not a basically schizoid person but was reacting by a schizoid defence to a particular situation.

R. had a dream shortly before starting treatment. He was on the footplate of a bus. The bus had no driver. He jumped off and the bus went on to crash. One is tempted to regard a dream he had after four months of psychotherapy as a measure of some change in a desirable direction. 'I am running after a bus. Suddenly I'm on the footplate of the bus, and at the same time, I'm running after it. I'm trying to join up with myself on the bus but I can't entirely catch up on the bus. I felt frightened at this.'

One could multiply instances of this common experience of temporary dissociation. Sometimes it is intentionally induced; more often, it occurs without the individual's control. But in the patients here considered, the splitting is not simply a temporary reaction to a specific situation of great danger, which is reversible when the danger is past. It is, on the contrary, a basic orientation to life, and if it is followed back through their lives one usually finds that they seem, in fact, to have emerged from the early months of infancy with this split already under way. The 'normal' individual, in a situation all can see to be threatening to his being and to offer no real sense of escape, develops a schizoid state in trying to get outside it, if not physically, at least mentally: he becomes a mental observer, who looks on, detached and impassive, at what his body is doing or what is being done to his body. If this is so in the 'normal', it is at least possible to suppose that the individual whose abiding mode of being-in-the-world is of this split nature is living in what to him, if not to us, is a world that threatens his being from all sides, and from which there is no exit. This is indeed the case for such people. For them the world is a prison without bars, a concentration camp without barbed wire.

The paranoid has specific persecutors. Someone is against him. There is a plot on foot to steal his brains. A machine is concealed in the wall of his bedroom which emits mind rays to soften his brain,

or to send electric shocks through him while he is asleep. The person I am describing *feels* at this phase *persecuted by reality itself*. The world as it is, and other people as they are, are the dangers.

The self then seeks by being unembodied to transcend the world and hence to be safe. But a self is liable to develop which feels it is outside all experience and activity. It becomes a vacuum. Everything is there, outside; nothing is here, inside. Moreover, the constant dread of all that is there, of being overwhelmed, is potentiated rather than mitigated by the need to keep the world at bay. Yet the self may at the same time long more than anything for participation in the world. Thus, its greatest longing is felt as its greatest weakness and giving in to this weakness is its greatest dread, since in participation the individual fears that his vacuum will be obliterated, that he will be engulfed or otherwise lose his identity, which has come to be equated with the maintenance of the transcendence of the self even though this is a transcendence in avoid.

This detachment of the self means that the self is never revealed directly in the individual's expressions and actions, nor does it experience anything spontaneously or immediately. The self's relationship to the other is always at one remove. The direct and immediate transactions between the individual, the other, and the world, even in such basic respects as perceiving and acting, all come to be meaningless, futile, and false. One can represent the alternative state of affairs schematically as shown opposite.

Objects perceived by the self are experienced as real. Thoughts and feelings of which the self is the agent are alive and are felt to have point. Actions to which the self is committed are felt as genuine.

If the individual delegates all transactions between himself and the other to a system within his being which is not 'him', then the world is experienced as unreal, and all that belongs to this system is felt to be false, futile, and meaningless.

Everyone is subject to a certain extent at one time or another to such moods of futility, meaninglessness, and purposelessness, but in schizoid individuals these moods are particularly insistent. These moods arise from the fact that the doors of perception and/or the

Figure 1





Figure 2



gates of action are not in the command of the self but are being lived and operated by a false self. The unrealness of perceptions and the falsity and meaninglessness of all activity are the necessary consequences of perception and activity being in the command of a false self- a system partially dissociated from the 'true' self, which is, therefore, excluded from direct participation in the individual's relatedness with other persons and the world. A pseudo-duality is thus experienced in the individual's own being. Instead of the individual meeting the world with an integral self-hood, he disavows part of his own being along' with his disavowal of immediate attachment to things and people in the world. This can be represented schematically as follows:

Instead of

(self/body) <> other

the situation is

self < > (body-other)

The self, therefore, is precluded from having a direct relationship with real things and real people. When this has happened in patients, one is witness to the struggle which ensues to preserve the self's own sense of its own realness, aliveness, and identity. In the first scheme, one has a benign circle. *The reality of the world and of the self are mutually potentiated by the direct relationship between self and other.* In *Figure 2*, there is a vicious circle. Every element in this diagram comes to be experienced as more and more unreal and dead. Love is precluded and dread takes its place. The final effect is an overall experience of everything having come to a stop. Nothing moves; nothing is alive; everything is dead, including the self. The self by its detachment is precluded from a full experience of realness and aliveness. What one might call a *creative relationship* with the other, in which there is mutual enrichment of the self and the other (benign circle), is impossible, and an *interaction* is substituted which may seem to operate efficiently and smoothly for a while but which has no 'life' in it (*sterile relationship*). There is a quasi-it-it interaction instead of an I-thou relationship. This interaction is a dead process.

The inner self seeks to live by certain (apparently) compensating advantages. Such a self cherishes certain ideals. One, which was

very clear in the schoolboy David, is an inner honesty. Whereas all the exchanges with the other may be fraught with pretence, equivocation, hypocrisy, the individual seeks to achieve a relationship with himself that is scrupulously sincere, honest, frank. Anything may be concealed from others, but nothing must be hidden from himself. In this, the self attempts to become 'a relationship which relates itself to itself'\* to the exclusion of everything and anything. We have here the seeds of secondary splitting within the self. The individual's being having become cleft into a 'true' and a 'false' self, the true and false selves lose their realness as already indicated, but also they both in turn break into sub-systems within themselves. Thus, in the relationship that the self has with itself, one finds a second duality developing whereby the inner self splits to have a sado-masochistic relationship with itself. When this happens, the inner self, which had arisen, we suggested, in the first place as a means of clinging to a precarious sense of identity, begins to lose even what identity it had to begin with. (In the clinical illustrations, see particularly Rose, p. 150.)

The substitution of an interaction with the other results in the individual coming to live in a frightening world in which dread is unmitigated by love. The individual is frightened of the world, afraid that any impingement will be total, will be implosive, penetrative, fragmenting, and engulfing. He is afraid of letting anything of himself 'go', of coming out of himself, of losing himself in any experience, etc., because he will be depleted, exhausted, emptied, robbed, sucked dry.

The isolation of the self is a corollary, therefore, of the need to be in control. He prefers to *steal*, rather than to be given. He prefers to give, rather than have anything, as he feels, stolen from him; i.e. he has to be in control of who or what comes into him, and of who or what leaves him. This defensive system is elaborated, we suggest, to make up for the primary lack of ontological security. The individual who is sure of his own being does not require to adopt such measures. However, the effort to sustain a transcendent self, out of danger and in remote control of direct experiencing and

\* Kierkegaard's phrase in *The sickness unto death* (1954), but used here with quite different connotations.

action, issues in unwished-for consequences that may far outweigh what apparent gains there seemed to be.

Since the self, in maintaining its isolation and detachment does not commit itself to a creative relationship with the other and is preoccupied with the figures of phantasies, thought, memories, etc. (imagos), which cannot be directly observable by or directly expressed to others, anything (in a sense) is possible. Whatever failures or successes come the way of the false-self system, the self is able to remain uncommitted and undefined. In phantasy, the self can be anyone, anywhere, do anything, have everything. It is thus omnipotent and completely free - but only in phantasy. Once commit itself to any real project and it suffers agonies of humiliation - not necessarily for any failure, but simply because it has to subject itself to necessity and contingency. It is omnipotent and free only in phantasy. The more this phantastic omnipotence and freedom are indulged, the more weak, helpless, and fettered it becomes in actuality. The illusion of omnipotence and freedom can be sustained only within the magic circle of its own shut-upness in phantasy. And in order that this attitude be not dissipated by the slightest intrusion of reality, phantasy and reality have to be kept apart.

Sartre expresses this split very well in his *Psychology of Imagination* (1950, pp. 165-6):

... we can recognize two distinct selves in us: the imaginary self with its tendencies and desires - and the real self. There are imaginary sadists and masochists, persons of violent imagination. At each moment our imaginary self breaks in pieces and disappears at contact with reality, yielding its place to the real self. For the real and the imaginary cannot coexist by their very nature. It is a matter of two types of objects, of feelings and actions that are completely irreducible.

Hence, we may think that individuals will have to be classified in two large categories, according to whether they prefer to lead an imaginary life or a real life. But we must understand what a preference for the imaginary signifies. It is not at all a matter of preferring one sort of object to another. For instance, we should not believe that the schizophrenic and morbid dreamers in general try to substitute an unreal and more seductive and brighter content for the real content of their life, and that they seek to forget the unreal character of their images by reacting to them as if they were actual objects actually present. To

prefer the imaginary is not only to prefer a richness, a beauty, an imaginary luxury to the existing mediocrity *in spite of* their unreal nature. It is also to adopt 'imaginary' feelings and actions for the sake of their imaginary nature. It is not only this or that image that is chosen, but the imaginary state with everything it implies; it is not only an escape from the content of the real (poverty, frustrated love, failure of one's enterprise, etc.), but from the form of the real itself, its character of *presence*, the sort of response it demands of us, the adaptation of our actions to the object, the inexhaustibility of perception, their independence, the very way our feelings have of developing themselves.

This split between phantasy and reality is central to Minkowski's concept of autism.

But the person who does not act in reality and only acts in phantasy *becomes himself unreal*. The actual 'world' for that person becomes shrunken and impoverished. The 'reality' of the physical world and other persons ceases to be used as a pabulum for the creative exercise of imagination, and hence comes to have less and less significance in itself. Phantasy, without being either in some measure embodied in reality, or itself enriched by injections of 'reality', becomes more and more empty and volatilized. The 'self' whose relatedness to reality is already tenuous becomes less and less a reality-self, and more and more phantasticized as it becomes more and more engaged in phantastic relationships with its own phantoms (imagos).

Without an open two-way circuit between phantasy and reality anything becomes possible in phantasy. Destructiveness in phantasy goes on without the wish to make compensatory reparation, for the guilt that prompts towards preserving and making amends loses its urgency. Destructiveness in phantasy can thus rage on, unchecked, until the world and the self are reduced, in phantasy, to dust and ashes. In the schizophrenic state the world is in ruins, and the self is (apparently) dead. No amount of frantic activity seems to have the power to bring back life again.

Thus, what comes about has the very opposite effect to that desired. Real toads invade the imaginary gardens\* and ghosts walk in the real streets. Thus, in another way, the identity of the self is again jeopardized.

\* Marianne Moore, *Collected Poems*.



It is not quite correct to say that the self is related only to itself. It is necessary to qualify this in one respect and amplify it in another. We have already qualified this statement by making it clear that we are speaking of a direct and immediate relationship. It is this direct and immediate relationship with the other, and even with those aspects of the person's own being outside the enclave of the self, that becomes impossible.

A patient, for instance, who conducted his life along relatively 'normal' lines outwardly but operated this inner split, presented as his original complaint the fact that he could never have intercourse with his wife but only with his own image of her. That is, his body had physical relations with her body, but his mental self, while this was going on, could only look on at what his body was doing and/or *imagine* himself having intercourse with his wife as an object of his imagination. He gave the guilt he was subject to for doing this as his reason for seeking psychiatric advice.\*

This is an example of what I mean by saying that phantasy and reality are kept apart. The self avoids being related directly to real persons but relates itself to itself and to the objects which it itself posits. *The self can relate itself with immediacy to an object which is an object of its own imagination or memory but not to a real person.* This is not always apparent, of course, even to the individual himself, still less to anyone else. The wife of the above patient was quite unaware that he felt that 'he' had never had intercourse directly with her; he had had intercourse only with his imago of her which happened to coincide sufficiently well with her in reality for no one but himself to know the difference.

One feature of this subterfuge is that the self is able to enjoy a sense of freedom which it fears it will lose if it abandons itself to the real. This applies both to perception and action. This patient, however lonely he was in the moments of greatest physical intimacy, was at any rate safe, as he felt: his mind remained free, albeit this freedom became something to which he felt condemned.

An equivalent issue arises in respect of action. The individual's actions may appear from another person's point of view to be un-

\* The remarks on the guilt experienced by Peter (Chapter 8) are relevant to this form of schizoid guilt which, I believe, has not been sufficiently recognized.

equivocal and committed, but one finds that 'he' is going through the actions of doing something which 'he' feels he is not doing 'really'. Thus the above patient said that, although Kinsey might put down that he had intercourse two to four times per week for ten years, 'he' knew that he had never had intercourse 'really'. The transition from this type of statement to the statement of the psychotic millionaire who says he has no money 'really' is a decisive yet subtle one. As we shall see in Chapter 10, the transition seems to consist in a loss of the sense of the realness of the Kinsey Report reality so total that the individual expresses the 'existential' truth about himself with the same matter-of-factness that we employ about facts that can be consensually validated in a shared world.

This patient would have been psychotic, for instance, if, instead of saying that he never had intercourse with his wife 'really', he had insisted that the woman with whom he had intercourse was not his real wife. In a sense, this would be perfectly true: it would be existentially true because in this existential sense his 'real' wife was the object of his own imagination (a phantom or imago), rather than the other human being in bed with him.

The unembodied self of the schizoid individual cannot really be married to anyone. It exists in perpetual isolation. And yet, of course, this isolation and inner non-commitment are not without self-deception.

There is something final and definitive about an act, which this type of person regards with suspicion. Action is the dead end of possibility. It scleroses freedom. If it cannot be utterly eschewed, then every act must be of such an equivocal nature that the 'self' can never be trapped in it.

Hegel (1949, pp. 349-50) says this about the act:

The act is something simple, determinate, universal, to be grasped as an abstract, distinctive whole; it is murder, theft, a benefit, a deed of bravery, and so on, and what it *is* can be *said* of it. It *is* such, and such, and its being is not merely a symbol, it is the fact itself. It *is* this, and the individual human being *is* what the act *is*. In the simple fact that the act *is*, the individual is for others what he really is and with a certain general nature, and ceases to be merely something that is 'meant' or 'presumed' to be this or that. No doubt he is not put there in the form

of mind; but when it is a question of his being *qua* being, and the two-fold being of bodily shape and act are pitted against one another, each claiming to be his true reality, the deed *alone* is to be affirmed as his genuine being - not his figure or shape, which would express what he 'means' to convey by his acts, or what anyone might 'conjecture' he merely could do. In the same way, on the other hand, when his performance and his inner possibility, capacity, or intention are opposed, the former *alone* is to be regarded as his true reality, even if he deceived himself on the point and, after he has turned from his action into himself, means to be something else in his 'inner world' than what he is in the act. Individuality, which commits itself to the objective element, when it passes over into a deed no doubt puts itself to the risk of being altered and perverted. But what settles the character of the act is just this - whether the deed is a real thing that holds together, or whether it is merely a pretended or 'supposed' performance, which is in itself null and void and passes away. Objectification does not alter the act itself; it merely shows what the deed *is*, i.e. whether it *is* or whether it is *nothing*.

It can readily be understood why the schizoid individual so abhors action as characterized by Hegel. The act is 'simple, determinate, universal...'. But his self wishes to be complex, indeterminate, and unique. The act is 'what can be said of it'. But he must *never* be what can be said of him. He must remain always ungraspable, elusive, transcendent. The act is 'such, and such... it is this, and the individual human being is what the act is'. But he must at all costs never be what his act is. If he were what his act was, then he would be helpless and at the mercy of any passer-by. 'In the simple fact that the act is, the individual is for others what he really is', but this again is precisely what he most fears might happen, and what he seeks to avoid by the use of a false self so that 'he' is never what he really is with others. 'He', his 'self, is endless possibility, capacity, intention. The act is always the product of a false self. The act or the deed is never his true reality. He wishes to remain perpetually uncommitted 'to the objective element' - hence the deed is always (or at least he believes it to be) a pretended, a supposed performance, and he may actively cultivate as far as he can that 'inner' negation of all that he does in an effort to declare everything that he does 'null and void', so that in the world, in reality, in 'the objective element', nothing of 'him' shall exist, and

no footprints or fingerprints of the 'self shall have been left. Thus the self withholds itself from 'the objective element' both in respect of perception and of action. There can be no spontaneous action as there can be no spontaneous perception. And just as commitment in action is avoided, so perception is felt as an act of commitment that endangers the freedom to be nothing that the self possesses.

The self, as long as it is 'uncommitted to the objective element', is free to dream and imagine anything. Without reference to the objective element it can be all things to itself- it has unconditioned freedom, power, creativity. But its freedom and its omnipotence are exercised in a vacuum and its creativity is only the capacity to produce phantoms. The *inner honesty, freedom, omnipotence, and creativity*, which the 'inner' self cherishes as its ideals, are cancelled, therefore, by a coexisting tortured sense of self-duplicity, of the lack of any real freedom, of utter impotence and sterility.

Here, of course, I am primarily concerned to follow through the schizoid position into psychosis and not to describe the possibilities inherent in it which may lead in other directions, but one must bear in mind that deterioration and disintegration are only one outcome of the initial schizoid organization. Quite clearly, authentic versions of freedom, power, and creativity can be achieved and lived out.

Many schizoid writers and artists who are relatively isolated from the other succeed in establishing a creative relationship with things in the world, which are made to embody the figures of their phantasy. But theirs is not our present story. Throughout this study, I am focusing on only one line of development, and the generalizations I am making are intended to cover only this very limited area.

Now, although the self has an attitude of freedom and omnipotence, its refusal to commit itself to 'the objective element' renders it impotent: it has no freedom *in* 'reality'. Moreover, even in its own enclave, in its detachment it is constantly subject to (as it feels) the threat of an implosive or engulfing 'reality', and whereas it is preoccupied by itself and its own objects, it is still hyper-acutely aware of itself as an object in the eyes of others. Thus, the paradoxical difficulties of the schizoid individual are aggravated by

the special nature of the schizoid system of defences which we have described.

The individual has perhaps always the choice of endorsing his position of detachment, or of attempting to participate in life. The schizoid defence against 'reality' has, however, the grave disadvantage that it tends to perpetuate and potentiate the original threatening quality of reality. Participation of the self in life is possible, but only in the face of intense anxiety. Franz Kafka knew this very well, when he said that it was only through his anxiety that he could participate in life, and, for this reason, he would not be without it. For the schizoid individual direct participation 'in' life is felt as being at the constant risk of being destroyed by life, for the self's isolation is, as we said, its effort to preserve itself in the absence of an assured sense of autonomy and integrity.

The self of the schizoid has to be understood, therefore, as an attempt to achieve secondary security from the primary dangers facing him in his original ontological insecurity. One aspect of this original ontological insecurity not so far specifically related to the 'self is the precariousness of the individual's subjective sense of his own aliveness, and the sense of others threatening this tentative feeling. This problem will be considered more fully in the chapter on 'Self-consciousness'.

In the absence of a spontaneous natural, creative, relationship with the world which is free from anxiety, the 'inner self thus develops an overall sense of inner impoverishment, which is expressed in complaints of the emptiness, deadness, coldness, dryness, impotence, desolation, worthlessness, of the inner life. For instance, one presenting complaint was of the impoverishment of the imaginative and emotional life. The patient explained that he regarded this as a consequence of his own decision to shut himself out from reality. As a result, as he put it, he was getting no supplies from reality to enrich his imagination.

Another patient oscillated between moments when he felt as though he was bursting with power, and moments when he felt he had nothing inside and was lifeless. However, even his 'manic' feeling of himself was that he was a container full of air under tremendous pressure, in fact, nothing but hot air, and his sense of deflation came with this thought. The schizoid individual fre-

quently speaks of himself in these terms, such that, phenomenologically, we are justified in speaking of the vacuum that the self feels itself to be.

If the patient contrasts his own inner emptiness, worthlessness, coldness, desolation, dryness, with the abundance, worth, warmth, companionship that he may yet believe to be elsewhere (a belief which often grows to fantastically idealized proportions, uncorrected as it is by any direct experience), there is evoked a welter of conflicting emotions, from a desperate *longing* and yearning for what others have and he lacks, to frantic *envy* and hatred of all that is theirs and not his, or a desire to destroy all the goodness, freshness, richness in the world. These feelings may, in turn, be offset by counter-attitudes of disdain, contempt, disgust, or indifference.

This emptiness, this sense of inner lack of richness, substantiality and value, if it overweighs his illusory omnipotence, is a powerful prompter to make 'contact' with reality. The soul or self thus desolate and arid longs to be refreshed and fertilized, but longs not simply for a relationship between separable beings, but to be completely drenched and suffused by the other.

James (see pp. 143 ff.) told of how, when walking on a summer evening in the park alone, watching the couples making love, he suddenly began to feel a tremendous oneness with the whole world, with the sky and trees and flowers and grass - with the lovers too. He ran home in panic, and immersed himself in his books. He told himself he had no right to this experience, but more than that, he was terrified at the threatened loss of identity involved in this merging and fusion of his self with the whole world. He knew of no half-way stage between radical isolation: in self-absorption or complete absorption into all there was. He was afraid of being absorbed into Nature, engulfed by her, with irrevocable loss of his self; yet what he most dreaded, that also he most longed for. Mortal beauty, so Gerard Manley Hopkins said, is dangerous. If such individuals could take his advice to meet it, then let it alone, things would be easier. But it is just this which they cannot do.

The abundance *there* is longed for, in contrast to the emptiness *here*; yet participation without loss of being is felt to be impossible, and also is not enough, and so the individual must cling to his

isolation - his separateness without spontaneous, direct relatedness - because in doing so he is clinging to his identity. His longing is for complete union. But of this very longing he is terrified, because it will be the end of his self. He does not wish for a relationship of mutual enrichment and exchange of give-and-take between two beings 'congenial' to each other. He does not conceive of a dialectical relationship.\*

What may happen is that an experience of losing one's own individual isolated selfhood can be tolerated in certain circumscribed situations without too much anxiety. It may be possible to lose oneself in listening to music, or in quasi-mystical experiences when the self feels it is merged with a not-self which may be called 'God', but not necessarily. However, the longing of the self to escape from the tedium of its own company encounters generally two insurmountable obstacles in the anxiety and guilt that this longing arouses. There has already been mention in various contexts of the anxiety attendant on losing identity by being engulfed. One way, of course, of getting what one wants from someone, while retaining control of the process of acquisition, is by theft.

Schizoid phantasies of stealing and being robbed are based on this dilemma. If you steal what you want from the other, you are in control; you are not at the mercy of what is given. But every intention is instantly felt to be reciprocated. The desire to steal breeds phobias of being robbed. The phantasy that one has got any worth that one possesses by stealing it is accompanied by the counter-phantasy that the worth that others have has been stolen from oneself (see Rose, Chapter 9), and that anything one has will be taken away finally: not only what one *has*, but what one *is*, one's very self. Hence the common schizophrenic complaint that the 'self has been stolen, and the defences against this constant danger.

The final seal on the self-enclosure of the self is applied by its own guilt. In the schizoid individual guilt has the same paradoxical

\* Plato postulates that friendship can exist only between 'congenial' beings. However, the discussion on the possibility of friendship in the *Lysis* gets stuck at the dilemma: if two beings are not 'wanting' in anything, why should they want anything from the other? It is on this central issue - is he self-sufficient or does he 'want' anything? - that the schizoid person's life is liable to founder.

quality about it that was encountered in his omnipotence and impotence, his freedom and his slavery, his self being anyone in phantasy and nothing in reality. There would seem to be various sources of guilt within the individual's being. In a being that is split into different 'selves' one has to know which self is feeling guilty about what. In other words, in a schizoid individual there is not and cannot be a non-contradictory unified sense of guilt. On general principles, one might suppose that one sense of guilt might have its source in the false self, and another source of guilt might arise in the inner self. If, however, we call any guilt that the false-self system might be capable of having, false guilt, one will have to be careful to avoid regarding the inner self as the source of 'genuine' or true guilt.

Here, I wish merely to prepare the ground for a discussion of this problem at greater length on the basis of clinical material (pp. 129 ff..)

If there is anything the schizoid individual is likely to believe in, it is his own destructiveness. He is unable to believe that he can fill his own emptiness without reducing what is there to nothing. He regards his own love and that of others as being as destructive as hatred. To be loved threatens his self; but his love is equally dangerous to anyone else. His isolation is not entirely for his own self's sake. It is also out of concern for others. A schizophrenic patient would not allow anyone to touch her, not because they would do her some harm, but because she might electrocute them. And this is simply a psychotic expression of what the schizoid individual feels daily. He says, 'It would not be fair to anyone I might love, to love him.' What he may then do is to destroy 'in his mind' the image of anyone or anything he may be in danger of becoming fond of, out of a desire to safeguard that other person or thing in reality from being destroyed. If, then, there is nothing to want, nothing to envy, there may be nothing to love, but there is nothing to be reduced to nothing by him. In the last resort he sets about murdering his 'self, and this is not as easy as cutting one's throat. He descends into a vortex of non-being in order to avoid being, but also to preserve being from himself.